
The Primacy of Training

1. Biddle, Stephen, Wade P. Hinkle and Michael P. Fischerkeller. "Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1999. [\[Article\]](#)

Skill is more important than equipment. Americans mistakenly think technology ensured low casualties in the Gulf War. In reality, the skill and training levels of the U.S. forces was far more important than their technology or equipment.

"Suppressive fire can reduce hostile firing rates by a factor of 10 (or more) even when no target is directly killed."

2. Braddock, Joe and Ralph E. Chatham, chairmen. *Training for Future Conflicts*. Defense Science Board Task Force Final Report. Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, June 2003. [\[Document\]](#)

- *Modern Warfare demands more training.*
- *Skills are more important than hardware.*
- *Unit training is more important than schools.*
- *Training performance is not measured.*
- *Combat Centers deliver combat proficiency.*
- *The best place to spend a dollar is training.*

3. Braddock, Joe and Ralph E. Chatham, chairmen. *Training Superiority & Training Surprise*. Defense Science Board Task Force Report. Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, January 2001. [\[Document\]](#)

- *A new training revolution is needed. The future joint force requires more unit training, not individual training. Combat Training Centers must expand. Technology and manpower limitations make training efforts doubly important.*
- *Training counts. Warfighting success is dependent on peoples' skills, not hardware. Peoples' skills rust faster than ships. Hardware performance will not be realized without training. TOW missile proficiency is training-dependent, not hardware-dependent.*
- *We don't count training. We measure process, not proficiency.*
- *Move 50% of schoolhouse training to unit-based training. Reduce unit turbulence and disruption. Army would save \$114M per year in per diem.*

4. Brownlee, Romie L. and William J. Mullen III, editors. *Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, U.S. Army, Retired*. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: United States Military History Institute, 1979.

"The first thing that impressed everybody [in Normandy in 1944] was how a handful of Germans could hold up a regiment by sighting their weapons properly. If they had two assault guns... [one would be] on the reverse slope firing through a saddle...one behind a stone house, firing across the road...And you get an

understanding of sighting weapons. The Germans were just superior at that.”

“[In WWII] I would attach three heavy machine gun platoons to a single company...I’d put that company in an overwatch position...We’d just smother [them] with fire and...move around the flank...It was the only way I could figure out how to get firepower out of a light infantry battalion.”

“That’s why the mechanized infantry squad...can be very small, because it can operate in the fire envelope of the armored task force...We’re talking about 15 or 20 men...on foot...[and] about 10 or 12 tanks and about four Infantry Fighting Vehicles with automatic weapons on them that can totally suppress that woodline or those buildings...It is an appreciation of heavy direct fire suppression.”

“The second thing...is simplify the tactical training... responsibilities of the platoon leaders, company commanders and battalion commanders...Right now...They have too many men to be trained on too many weapons, in too short a time, with too many diversions...You can get more combat effectiveness by increasing the performance of the unit than...by...new weapons...Improve performance by...increasing the leadership mix, and...reducing the size of units so that the tactical and technical training comes back down to manageable levels.”

“The difference between the good unit and the bad unit is often a factor of four or five, even though they have the same number of men and the same weapons... We can get...improved performance...through the careful selection of people, the training of people, the selection of leaders, and the training of leaders and units.”

5. DePuy, William E. *Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy*. Compiled by Colonel Richard M. Swain. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994. [[Part I](#)] [[Part II](#)] [[Part III](#)] [[Part IV](#)] [[Part V](#)] [[Part VI](#)]

“We do not train brigade...commanders in the U.S. Army. We...take a chance that an intelligent officer...must have...instincts which will make him an effective commander. This is, of course, mostly nonsense...We spend less time teaching our colonels and generals...than did the Army of the 1930s.”

“Over the years, we have loaded into our school system a lot of...quasi-military subjects...there was no time...for the Officer Basic Course to teach the construction of defensive positions...”

“Israeli tankers...are trained for much longer periods than their counterparts in the U.S. Army...the Israeli Army trains its soldiers, sergeants, and officers. It does not educate them. There are no frills. In the officers course 70% of the instruction is in the field in a unit with weapons and equipment.”

6. Evans, Michael and Alan Ryan, editor. *The Human Face in Warfare*. Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty., Limited, 2001. [[Extracts from Chapter 11](#)]
7. Gorman, Paul F. *The Secret of Future Victories*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992. [[Document](#)]

“But the point discovered by DePuy and Fry in battle, that teamwork within the

squad was more important than any individual quality, and could avoid needless casualties...eluded both McNair and Marshall. They centered their attention on the individual training of the infantryman... From 1944 through 1974, the primary product of the Army's training base...was individual replacements."

8. Hansen, Thomas E. *Beating Ploughshares Into Swords: The Quest for Combat Readiness in the Eighth United States Army Before the Korean War*. Ohio: The Ohio State University, n.d.

Contrary to popular belief, 8th Army did train in Japan prior to June 1950. Its training efforts however, were shackled by unit turbulence, excessive training distractors, and significant shortages of equipment. Task Force Smith was representative of the 8th Army. Good leaders had plenty of WWII experience, but their units were fragmented, not cohesive, and under-trained in collective battle skills. The disaster that befell TF Smith was caused by rotation and personnel policies, not a lack of training effort.

9. Roderick, Bill A. "Marine Corps Ground Forces Training." Naval Audit Service Report 2002-0004. Washington DC: Navy Yard, 18 July 2002.

"We found that Marine Corps ground force commanders...were not planning, documenting, and evaluating unit training..."

10. Rosenberger, John D. "Reaching Our Army's Full Combat Potential in the 21st Century: Insights from the National Training Center's Opposing Force." Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army Institute of Land Warfare, February 1999. Reprinted in *Armor*, May-June 1999. [\[Article\]](#)

The OPFOR at NTC is very good because they live, organize, train, and focus on combat. Its leaders are certified in battle skills. Unit SOPs, for planning, preparing, and fighting, are well-understood, drilled and expertly executed. Regular Army units do not organize or train ruthlessly for war. Our leaders are not certified on battlefield skills. That is what we should learn from the OPFOR.

11. Rosenberger, John D. "Statement by Colonel John D. Rosenberger to the House Armed Services Committee, 106th Congress." Washington, DC: February 26, 1999. [\[Summary\]](#)

12. Rosenberger, John D. "The Burden Our Soldiers Bear: Observations of a Senior Trainer (O/C)." *Combat Training Center (CTC) Quarterly Bulletin*, No. 95-11, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 1995. [\[Document\]](#)

Last year, I observed 12 Brigades fight a hundred simulated battles. They lost most of them. We've be at this for 14 years in the Mohave desert with no substantial change in the pattern. We have shown little improvement in our ability to fight as a combined arms team, especially at the brigade level. Improved technology does not help. Our indifferent attitude toward our deficiencies hurts our Army and prevents the improvements needed.

The Primacy of Infantry

1. Bolger, Dan. "Battle for Hunger Hill: The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment at the Joint Readiness Training Center." Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1997.
2. Canby, Steven L. "Classic Light Infantry and New Technology." Potomac, Maryland: C & L Associates, December 1983.
3. Canby, Steven L. "Light Infantry Perspective" A Paper Presented to the Infantry Commander's Conference, Fort Benning, Georgia, 6 March 1984.
4. English, John A., and Bruce I. Gudmundsson. *On Infantry (Revised Edition)*. Praeger Publishers, 1994.
5. FM 7-71 *Light Infantry Company*.
6. FM 7-72 *Light Infantry Battalion*.

Both FM 7-71 and 7-72 were published in the early 1980s when the U.S. Army re-instituted the Light Infantry Divisions. These manuals contained tremendously detailed and valuable information on light infantry tactics and procedures. They were discontinued and some of their content was folded into the Army's standard infantry field manuals.

7. "Generals Balck and Von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine." McLean, Virginia: BDM Corporation, December 19, 1980. [[Document](#)]

In 1980, at a four-day conference in Virginia, German Generals Balck and Von Mellenthin shared their ideas on how to fight the Soviet Army. U.S. Generals DePuy, Gorman and Otis participated. This report is a summary of the 155 pages of material collected. The German generals, both with extensive experience on the Eastern front during WWII, provided unique insight on tactics, training, personnel issues, and Russian fighting styles.

8. Kelley, John F., and Philip E. Smith. "Teaching Light Infantry Tactics." *Marine Corps Gazette*, March, 1991.
9. Kirk, BG. *5th Mechanized Division Battlebook*. Germany: 1988. Reprinted at Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

A tremendous SOP developed between 1978 and 1988 by BG Kirk, ADC(M) of the 5th Mechanized Division. Kirk's overwhelming emphasis is on how to fight the Soviets with mechanized forces at the tactical level. The practical value of this book is its focus on drills, terrain, and tactics.

“[The] Army had done a fine job teaching...commanders to draw grand goose eggs...Symbols bore little relation to ground, enemy, next war.”

10. McMichael, Scott R. *A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry*. Research Survey No 6. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September 1987. [[Part I](#)] [[Part II](#)] [[Part III](#)] [[Part IV](#)] [[Part V](#)] [[Part VI](#)] [[Part VII](#)] [[Part VIII](#)] [[Part IX](#)] [[Part X](#)] [[Part XI](#)] [[Part XII](#)]

A well-researched and valuable overview of light infantry history and concepts. McMichael examines four forces – The Chindits in the jungles of Burma in WWII, the Chinese Army in the Korean War, the British Army in Malaya from 1948-1966, and the First Special Service Force in WWII – to compare tactics, equipment, training and philosophies.

11. McMichael, Scott R. “Discussions on Training and Employing Light Infantry.” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 5 July 1984. [[Document](#)]

McMichael interviews two British officers on the importance of a light infantry mindset and attitude, and the selection and training of light infantry units.

12. Menser, Michael W. “Light Infantry and Change.” *Military Review*, December, 1987.
13. Schmitt, John. “Light Infantry Tactics at the Company Level and Lower.” *Marine Corps Gazette*, June, 1990.
14. Stolfi, Russell. “German Battle Style in Ultra Mobile, High Intensity War: North African Desert 1941-42.” Monterey, California: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, n.d. [[Summary](#)]
15. Stolfi, Russell. “Taking Action in War.”

The Marine Corps can do battle-fighting better. The Marine Corps is constrained by its 1941-1945 experience of short, small, and slow battles. Our long planning, careful phasing, and short sharp battle experience has corrupted our doctrine and now retards our initiative and ability to rapidly execute sweeping action.

16. “Translation of Taped Conversation with General Hermann Balck, 12 January 1979 and Brief Biographical Sketch.” Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Columbus Laboratories, January 1979.
17. “Translation of Taped Conversation with General Hermann Balck, 13 April 1979.” Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Columbus Laboratories. July 1979.

General Balck crossed the Sedan River in 1940 as a Lieutenant Colonel commanding the lead battalion of the main German effort of the invasion of France. Five years later, he was a full General. His WWII experiences fighting French, British, American, and especially Russian forces make his thoughts on tactics, airpower, leadership and organization especially valuable.

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18. Uhle-Wettler, Franz. "Battlefield Central Europe: Danger of Overreliance on Technology by the Armed Forces."

Bundeswehr General Uhle-Wettler's paper discusses the problems of overreliance on mechanized forces at the expense of foot-mobile infantry. Wehrmacht armored units during WWII were supported by large numbers of marching infantry units. Who will support the modern Bundeswehr when it moves to a completely mechanized force? Who will protect the flanks and rear? Who will fight in built-up areas and execute those difficult infantry-specific tasks?

19. Wyly, Michael D. "Light Infantry and Vietnam: Why Generals Need to Study Tactics." *Marine Corps Gazette*, June, 1990.
20. Wyly, Michael D. "The Meaning of the Light Infantry Concept." *Marine Corps Gazette*, June, 1990.