

An Outline of

# **“Training Infantry to Win In the Deadly Battlefield of the Future”**

by Major Paul D. Refling, USMC  
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## **1. Executive Summary**

- a. The Marine Corps infantry training process needs to be refined and refocused.
- b. Individual training in schools and units is generally excellent.
- c. Collective training in units suffers from personnel turbulence, uneven NCO training ability, large unit exercises pre-emption of small-unit training, and unrealistic division training orders.
- d. Large units fail to train realistically in exercises.

## **2. Introduction**

- a. Four types of training: (1) individual, (2) small-unit, (3) large-unit, battalion and above, and (4) staff training.
- b. Progressive, “building block” training works from individual skills up through small-unit collective skills, up to large unit collective skills.

## **3. Individual Training**

- a. Recruit Depot and SOI have resources, ammunition, and ability to enforce individual training standards.
- b. Individual training in units suffers from lack of training ammunition.
- c. Individual training in units suffers because promotion is not tied to individual skill levels.
- d. MOS promotion exams would emphasize individual skill acquisition. Units today have no requirement to test Marines.

#### 4. Small Unit Training

- a. Small units are marginally trained for battle.
- b. Personnel turbulence at squad level is a serious impediment to training.
- c. Uneven training ability of NCOs, half of whom may never have served in an infantry unit before. NCOs from non-FMF duty stations lead Marines with skill levels greater than their own.
- d. Large unit exercises pre-empt scheduled small-unit training.
- e. Large unit exercises are conducted without regard for how they affect small-unit training. Time slots allocated for small-units during large exercises are not well-planned. Through the eyes of a Corporal, large unit training violates some basic tactical guidelines.
- f. Division training orders are not results-oriented, do not allocate sufficient ammunition, do not refer to specific training standards, and include no inspections to insure conformance. Small units are not required to show collective standard competence.
- g. Solutions:
  - Determine amount of training required for each collective standard, and allocate this time to each echelon. This would create a standard training cycle and prevent large-exercise pre-emption of small unit training.
  - Cut down on personnel turbulence. Transfer Marines in and out of a unit prior to the training cycle.
  - Schedule schools only during the 'receive and detach' portion of the training cycle.
  - The training cycle is then linked to the deployment cycle.
  - Make large unit exercises conform to reality.
  - Rewrite division training orders to realistically allocate ammunition, ranges, and evaluations to conform to training standards orders.

## **5. Large Unit Exercises**

- a. Current large-unit exercises are not effective for training to win in battle.
- b. Poor intelligence training is a result of unrealistic enemy scenarios. NBC is rarely tested.
- c. Unrealistic ammunition expenditures waste ammunition on every target visible.

## **6. Staff Training**

- a. Staffs do not train to fight on the mobile battlefields of the future.
- b. Months of preparation, typed orders, and un-moveable headquarters are unrealistic.
- c. Defense of headquarters is rarely tested.
- d. Solution: Take the division staff to the field for a month. Displace every two days. Dig in to defend the headquarters. Require the staff to issue operation orders in the field.

## **7. Conclusion**

Realistic training is the vehicle for victory. Train every day as if battle will come tomorrow.