

An Outline of

“Training Infantry to Win In the Deadly Battlefield of the Future”

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1. Executive Summary

- a. The Marine Corps infantry training process needs to be refined and refocused.
- b. Individual training in schools and units is generally excellent.
- c. Collective training in units suffers from personnel turbulence, uneven NCO training ability, large unit exercises pre-emption of small-unit training, and unrealistic division training orders.
- d. Large units fail to train realistically in exercises.

2. Introduction

- a. Four types of training: (1) individual, (2) small-unit, (3) large-unit, battalion and above, and (4) staff training.
- b. Progressive, “building block” training works from individual skills up through small-unit collective skills, up to large unit collective skills.

3. Individual Training

- a. Recruit Depot and SOI have resources, ammunition, and ability to enforce individual training standards.
- b. Individual training in units suffers from lack of training ammunition.
- c. Individual training in units suffers because promotion is not tied to individual skill levels.
- d. MOS promotion exams would emphasize individual skill acquisition. Units today have no requirement to test Marines.

4. Small Unit Training

- a. Small units are marginally trained for battle.
- b. Personnel turbulence at squad level is a serious impediment to training.
- c. Uneven training ability of NCOs, half of whom may never have served in an infantry unit before. NCOs from non-FMF duty stations lead Marines with skill levels greater than their own.
- d. Large unit exercises pre-empt scheduled small-unit training.
- e. Large unit exercises are conducted without regard for how they affect small-unit training. Time slots allocated for small-units during large exercises are not well-planned. Through the eyes of a Corporal, large unit training violates some basic tactical guidelines.
- f. Division training orders are not results-oriented, do not allocate sufficient ammunition, do not refer to specific training standards, and include no inspections to insure conformance. Small units are not required to show collective standard competence.
- g. Solutions:
 - Determine amount of training required for each collective standard, and allocate this time to each echelon. This would create a standard training cycle and prevent large-exercise pre-emption of small unit training.
 - Cut down on personnel turbulence. Transfer Marines in and out of a unit prior to the training cycle.
 - Schedule schools only during the 'receive and detach' portion of the training cycle.
 - The training cycle is then linked to the deployment cycle.
 - Make large unit exercises conform to reality.
 - Rewrite division training orders to realistically allocate ammunition, ranges, and evaluations to conform to training standards orders.

5. Large Unit Exercises

- a. Current large-unit exercises are not effective for training to win in battle.
- b. Poor intelligence training is a result of unrealistic enemy scenarios. NBC is rarely tested.
- c. Unrealistic ammunition expenditures waste ammunition on every target visible.

6. Staff Training

- a. Staffs do not train to fight on the mobile battlefields of the future.
- b. Months of preparation, typed orders, and un-moveable headquarters are unrealistic.
- c. Defense of headquarters is rarely tested.
- d. Solution: Take the division staff to the field for a month. Displace every two days. Dig in to defend the headquarters. Require the staff to issue operation orders in the field.

7. Conclusion

Realistic training is the vehicle for victory. Train every day as if battle will come tomorrow.