

Lessons from Naktong

1. Light Infantry in Mountain Terrain
 - a. Resupply. Movement. Defense in Depth. LOS. Lack of roads increases importance.
 - b. Footmobile Infantry are unbeatable in the mountains. Mountain terrain allows infantry to play to their strengths.
 - c. U.S. Army units limited maneuver to road nets, avoided hills and trackless regions. How did 4th NKPA operations differ from 25th ID? "Unhampered by road fixation, NKPA were more agile, able to cut MSR from southern trackless region." Why are Americans so tied to roads? Ironically, the remote Naktong sector was deemed by U.S. planners as the least likely place for an attack due to its lack of roads.
 - d. Encirclement is mental. Infiltration operations invite encirclement.
2. Riverline Defense. River is moat and tank-ditch.
 - a. Both sides of river need coverage. Do NOT let enemy choose crossing point by ceding control of far side. See also Balck. Hills on east side provided excellent observation.
 - b. Infantry can *always* cross a river.
 - c. Vehicles, Tanks, and logistics need fords, ferries.
 - d. Twisting river inhibits observation, lengthens sectors to cover.
3. CATK Doctrine
 - a. INTEL. Aerial recon is inadequate against infantry in mountains. NKPA used extensive camouflage, excellent night movement techniques. Ground Intel was non-existent.
 - b. TIMING. Immediate and local versus deliberate and delayed. All levels should execute local immediate CATK to take advantage of psychological lull.
 - c. AXIS to the FLANK. Attack the neck, not the nose. Naktong Battles violated this universally.
 - d. SINGLE COMMANDER.
 - e. LARGE ME CATK RESERVE. CATK force needs mobility, planned routes. CATK cannot be minutely planned.
4. Ad-hoc rear area security forces. Artillery units. HQ. All division units should have residual combat capability.

5. No doctrine for skeletonized units.
6. Problems with HHQ order:
 - a. Counterattack on line. Counterattack into the nose of the penetration. Not *really* a counterattack at all. No attempt to cut enemy lines of retreat despite verbiage in order.
 - b. "Intermediate objectives are established to synchronize...advance" Tying one unit to another's success *kills all initiative*. Opportunities cannot be exploited. Excuses for failing to advance are legion. Avoid these types of restrictions.
 - c. Scheme of Fires. One battalion in support of each regiment? Where is ruthless allocation of resources in support of ME?
 - d. 5th Marines tasks. One single sentence is enough! More detail actually clouds the key task and confuses the commander. The three sub-tasks, (a), (b) and (c) *contradict* the main task! Task (a) introduces "North-South MSR" as the purpose. Who cares about that road? Micromanagement. ME task should mirror HHQ mission.